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Abstract This article investigates empirically whether shocks to asset prices trans-
mit into the trade balance through consumption and investment for a group of five of
the world’s most industrialized countries. We refer to this transmission channel as the
international wealth channel and estimate a GVAR model including 29 countries with
quarterly data over the period 1981Q1–2006Q4. Generalized impulse response func-
tions show that after a negative stock price shock US and UK consumption decreases,
followed by an improving trade balance. This pattern is also visible for France, but
not for Germany and Japan. Stock price decreases are only associated with decreasing
investment and an improving trade balance in the UK. For housing, we do find that
a negative shock to UK housing prices decreases domestic investment and improves
the trade balance. However, this pattern is not visible in the other countries. Finally,
a domestic negative real exchange rate shock only has a significantly positive impact
on the US trade balance.
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1 Introduction
Over the past two decades, global trade imbalances increased sharply, characterized
by large US trade deficits and large trade surpluses for other countries, such as China
and Japan. Several causes and solutions have been put forward to explain these imbal-
ances, e.g., necessary exchange rate adjustments (Blanchard et al. 2005) or relative
output growth rates due to productivity differentials (Bems et al. 2007; Corsetti et al.
2008). Caballero et al. (2008) argue that the US is the main destination for savings of
Asian and oil producing economies, since the US has the capacity to produce finan-
cial assets, thereby creating US trade deficits. However, the role of asset prices has
received relatively little attention, even though assets such as stocks and housing prop-
erty constitute the bulk of household wealth. Fratzscher et al. (2010) investigate the
relative importance of stock market and housing prices for the US current account.1
Their results show that asset price changes are at least as important as exchange rate
movements for the US current account balance.
While Fratzscher et al. (2010) investigate the effect of asset price changes on the
current account, this article investigates explicitly how the asset price shocks are trans-
mitted via consumption or investment decisions to the trade balance. We refer to this
channel as the international wealth channel. Its existence is investigated for a group
of five of the world’s most industrialized economies (G5)—the US, UK, France, Ger-
many, and Japan. We are particularly interested in studying the relative strength of the
international wealth channel and test whether or not it can emerge as a potent alterna-
tive to the traditional exchange rate channel in correcting global trade imbalances.
We empirically analyze the international wealth channel using the GVAR model,
first introduced by Pesaran et al. (2004)—hereafter PSW—and advanced in Dees et al.
(2007). We include 29 countries with data at quarterly frequency over the time period
1981Q1–2006Q4. The country sample covers all countries and regions that figure
prominently in the current debate on global imbalances—US, China, Europe, Asia,
and oil-exporting countries. The most important reason for ending the sample period
in 2006 is the outbreak of the financial crisis in 2007. While the GVAR can accommo-
date so called “co-breaking”, the changes during 2007–2010 are so dramatic that the
model will not work properly. In particular, estimated relationships between variables
will change. However, a full fledged modeling of the financial crisis using a model
better suitable to capture the financial crisis is beyond the scope of this article. Hence,
we focus on the pre-crisis wealth channel and how it operates under tranquil times.
An important advantage of the GVAR model, compared to the Bayesian VAR
model of Fratzscher et al. (2010), is that we model the developments in foreign coun-
tries explicitly, instead of leaving the rest of the world unmodeled. Considering, for
instance, a shock to US asset markets, our estimation strategy allows for the possibility
that the shock translates into the asset markets, and subsequently consumption and
investment decisions, of the other 28 countries from where it potentially feeds back
into the US trade balance.
1 See Fratzscher and Straub (2009) for a multi-country application.
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The article investigates the effect of three specific negative shocks on consump-
tion/investment and the trade balance using generalized impulse response functions:
(1) exchange rate, (2) stock price, and (3) housing price. Overall, the empirical results
do not show a homogenous picture across countries and we need to conclude that the
international wealth channel is an important determinant of trade balance movements
in some countries, but not all.
A domestic real exchange rate depreciation only has a significant positive impact
on the US trade balance. It is surprising that this negative real exchange rate shock
has a negligible effect on the trade balance of Germany and Japan, which are strong
export-oriented economies.
There is evidence for the presence of the international wealth channel after a domes-
tic stock price shock. For the US and UK consumption decreases significantly after
the shock, followed by an improving trade balance in both countries. This pattern is
also visible for France, but not for Germany and Japan. When investigating the inter-
national wealth channel with investment in the model, we only find evidence for its
presence in the UK.
Finally, the housing price shock does not show evidence of the international wealth
channel through consumption. Even though the US trade balance improves, the shock is
not transmitted through US consumption. When investigating the transmission through
investment, we do find that a negative shock to UK housing prices decreases domestic
investment and improves the trade balance. However, this pattern is not visible in any
of the other countries.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the theory on
the international wealth channel. Next, Sect. 3 sets out the empirical setup and the
data series that we have used. Section 4 presents the impulse response functions, and
Sect. 5 discusses the forecast error variance decomposition. Finally, Sect. 6 concludes.
2 The international wealth channel
The international wealth channel is the process where asset price changes are transmit-
ted to the trade balance through consumption and investment decisions by households
and firms. Wealth changes do not only impact the demand for domestically produced
goods and services in an open economy, but will also change the demand for imported
goods and services. Fratzscher et al. (2010) and Fratzscher and Straub (2009) show
that stock and housing price shocks have a significant impact on the trade balance
mainly for the US, whereas the reaction of other countries differs. This article focuses
explicitly on the transmission channel. When investigating these shocks we signal out
two transmission channels: (1) asset prices → consumption → trade balance and (2)
asset prices → investment → trade balance.
First, consider the theoretical motivation of the consumption channel. The per-
manent income hypothesis predicts that private consumption increases in response
to household wealth increases (Modigliani and Brumberg 1954; Friedman 1957).
Many authors find empirical evidence that stock and housing price increases have a
significantly positive effect on consumption (Ludvigson and Steindel 1999;
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Lettau and Ludvigson 2001, 2004; Case et al. 2005; Palumbo et al. 2006). This holds
not only for the US, but for a large number of countries.
In an open economy model, Caballero et al. (2008) link wealth changes to the trade
balance via consumption. Basically, wealth is explicitly incorporated in the consump-
tion function and, by construction, the trade balance is domestic production minus
consumption and thus depends directly on wealth changes. On the other hand, Laibson
and Mollerstrom (2010) provide an alternative theoretical model connecting asset price
bubbles, with increasing consumption and worsening trade balances. Fratzscher and
Straub (2009) provide empirical evidence for the existence of this channel for the US,
Germany, and France. However, they do not find it to be present for the UK, Italy,
Japan, and Canada.
The second channel through which asset prices transmit to the trade balance of a
country are business and private expenditures on investments. The theoretical roots of
this alternative are based on Tobin’s q-theory of business investment (Tobin 1969). It
posits that firms find it attractive to invest in their capital stock in bullish asset markets
as the ratio between the market value and the replacement value of its capital stock
increases (Barro 1990). The same reasoning applies to housing investment. Basically,
when the prices of houses increase, it is attractive to build new houses and devote
resources to the construction sector (Green et al. 2005). Running a trade deficit allows
the financing of these housing investments (Punzi 2008).
3 Methodology
In this section, we first motivate the variables included in the country-individual mod-
els and discuss data considerations. Next, we briefly outline the GVAR methodology
and address a number of issues surrounding the proper fitting of the models to the data
generating process.2
3.1 Variable selection and data considerations
The inclusion of variables in the country-individual models is guided by simple aggre-
gate demand functions of open economy models and our focus on the international
wealth channel (Obstfeld and Rogoff 1996; Sørensen and Whitta-Jacobsen 2005). We
consider two separate models to investigate the role of consumption and investment
in the transmission of asset shocks. Consider first the ki × 1 vector of endogenous
variables with consumption included
yi t = [tbi t rci t ryi t reeri t rsi t rhi t r si t r li t poili t ]′3 (1)
2 For a full exposition of the GVAR methodology, we refer the interested reader to Pesaran et al. (2004)
and Dees et al. (2007).
3 Depending on the availability of data, we include fewer variables in some country models. See the
Appendix for data availability and sources.
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for country-individual VECM, i . Note that the ordering of the variables is not important
since we use generalized impulse response functions in the empirical analysis.
The trade balance (tbi t ) is defined as the log of exports over imports; real consump-
tion (rci t ) is the log of household consumption; real gross domestic product (ryi t ) is
the log of gdp; the real effective exchange rate (reeri t ) is expressed in logs; real stock
market prices (rsi t ) are the log of a broad stock market index and real housing prices
(rhi t ) are the log of a housing price index. We capture the short term real interest
rate (r si t ) using the three-month money market rate and the real long term interest
rate (r li t ) as the rate on 10-year government bonds. Both interest rates are calculated
by rqi t = ln(1 + Rqi t/100), where Rqi,t is the short or long term real interest rate. All
variables except tbi t and reeri t are deflated by the consumer price index to express
these in real terms.
The nominal log oil price (poili t ) controls for global political events as an observable
common factor to all countries. Despite the growing importance of emerging econo-
mies, most notably China, we follow Dees et al. (2007) and include poili t as an endoge-
nous variable only in the US model, while retaining it as weakly exogenous in all other
country models. A weak exogeneity test supports this choice. Table 1 summarizes the
availability of variables across countries.
To analyze the transmission through investment behavior we replace real consump-
tion with real investment (rii t ) in Eq. 1:
yi t = [tbi t rii t ryi t reeri t rsi t rhi t r si t r li t poili t ]′. (2)
In both models, we include the trade balance instead of the current account, because
our objective is to capture the consumption or investment induced demand for foreign
goods and services. The current account also includes factor income received and paid,
which should be relatively unaffected by e.g., a domestic increase in housing prices.
Hence, the trade balance measures more closely the domestic and foreign demand for
goods and services. Expressing the trade balance as the log of exports over imports
brings this variable closer to a normal distribution, compared to expressing it as a per-
centage of gdp. This is an important consideration in a VAR which assumes normally
distributed errors.
The real effective exchange rate captures the competitiveness of an economy, while
movements in financial and non-financial household wealth are captured by rsi t and
rhi t , respectively. The use of price indices as proxies for household wealth can be
viewed as a limitation of our analysis. Fortunately, studies by Ludwig and Sløk (2004)
and Fratzscher et al. (2010) confirm that differences to volume-based proxies for
wealth are immaterial in estimations. Moreover, price indices allow exploiting the
quarterly frequency at which these data are available.
We include r si t and r li t in the country models to capture the term structure of interest
rates. Both interest rates are necessary to properly model the financial and real vari-
ables. For example, short term rates are important for exchange rates and stock market
returns, while housing prices depend more on long term interest rates.
Consumption and investment are not modeled jointly for several reasons. First, we
aim to investigate the international wealth channel for each of the two variables sep-
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992 N. Holinski, R. Vermeulen
arately, i.e., we avoid a contemporaneous dependence of consumption on investment
and vice versa. Second, further increasing the number of variables results in degree of
freedom problems.
In order to link the individual country models and create international transmission
channels, we match the domestic variables with trade-weighted foreign variables. The
foreign variables remain unmodeled in the country models and thus need to satisfy
weak exogeneity requirements for inference and impulse response analysis. We test
and elaborate on the weak-exogeneity condition below. The k∗i × 1 vector of foreign
variables is denoted by






i t ]′ (3)
with consumption, and






i t ]′ (4)
with investment included. The trade-weighted averages are calculated using the sum
of bilateral exports and imports between country i and j relative to total exports and
imports of country i .4 We employ time-invariant trade-weights in the construction
of foreign variables, which we obtain as averages over the years 2000–2004. Results
show a large correlation between the foreign variables when using fixed or varying
trade weights. This strong relationship is not spurious, because the correlation between
the first differenced foreign variables is also very high, especially for financial data.
Therefore, using time-invariant weights is not overly restrictive.
Obviously, the correct choice of the weights is key in creating the international
transmission channels. The use of information on bilateral trade in goods and services
seems to be the natural choice for our study on the international wealth channel. An
alternative choice is information on bilateral capital flows. Unfortunately, data are not
consistently available for all countries in our sample and we do not expect significant
differences. In fact, several studies show that trade in goods and services are highly
correlated with capital flows (Portes and Rey 2005; Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2008).5
3.2 Estimating the GVAR model
The GVAR methodology of PSW and Dees et al. (2007) proceeds in two stages. The
first stage is the estimation stage of the following reduced form augmented vector
autoregression, VARX(p, q), model for each country i in our sample, while in the
second stage we stack all 29 individual country VARX models and link them using a
weight matrix.
4 The complete trade weight matrix is available upon request. We adjust the trade-weights if data are not
available for some countries and some variables.
5 Alternatively, one can consider using bilateral bank lending exposures instead of trade weights (Galesi
and Sgherri 2009). Unfortunately, data availability is a problem. For example, lending exposures for China
are missing and for other countries data for the timespan 1980–2006 is not fully available. Hence, for this
study a weighting matrix based on trade weights is most attractive.
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In the first step, we model each country as a VARX(p, q)






Ψ imy∗i,t−m + i t ,
i = 1, 2, . . . , N , t = 1, 2, . . . , T (5)
where δi0 and δi1 are ki × 1 coefficient vectors of the deterministic intercept and time
trend.6 yi t is a ki × 1 vector of country-specific variables, as determined in Eq. 1 with
consumption, Eq. 2 with investment and corresponding ki × ki matrices of lagged
coefficients, denoted by Φ il . y∗i t is a k∗i ×1 vector of trade-weighted foreign variables,
as determined in Eq. 3 with consumption, Eq. 4 with investment and corresponding
ki × k∗i matrices of contemporaneous and lagged coefficients, denoted by Ψ im . i t
is a ki × 1 vector of zero mean, idiosyncratic country-specific shocks, assumed to be
serially uncorrelated with a time invariant covariance matrix i i .
The weak exogeneity assumption of y∗i t rules out long run feedbacks from yi t to y∗i t .
However, we do allow for short run feedbacks between yi t and y∗i t . Next, we determine
the order of the dynamic specification according to the Akaike information criterion
(AIC). We allow at maximum for a VARX(2, 1) specification to reduce the number of
estimated parameters and avoid degrees of freedom problems. The lag orders of the
individual countries are reported in Table 2.
In the second stage of the GVAR methodology, we cast the country-specific models
into their global representation. First, we determine the number of long-run cointe-
grating vectors according to the trace test statistic (Table 2) and rewrite (5) in its
error-correction form
Aizi t = δi0 + δi1t − (Ai − Bi − Ci )zi,t−1 − Φ i2yi,t−1 + i t , (6)
where zi t = (yi t y∗i t )′. Next, we stack the endogenous variables of all individual coun-
try models in a k × 1 global variable vector yt = (y1t , y2t . . . yNt )′ with k = ∑Ni=1 ki
and solve for the global VECM representation



































6 The estimations are based on the GAUSS code of Vanessa Smith.
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Table 2 VARX order and number of cointegrating relationships
Country/region Consumption model Investment model
VARX∗(pi , qi ) # Cointegrating
relationships
VARX∗(pi , qi ) # Cointegrating
relationships
pi qi pi qi
United States 2 1 3 2 1 3
China 2 1 2 2 1 4
India 2 1 1 2 1 1
Japan 2 1 4 2 1 4
Europe
Austria 2 1 4 2 1 6
Belgium 2 1 5 2 1 6
Denmark 2 1 5 1 1 5
Finland 2 1 3 2 1 2
France 2 1 3 2 1 4
Germany 1 1 3 1 1 3
Italy 2 1 3 1 1 3
Luxembourg 2 1 3 2 1 2
Netherlands 2 1 3 2 1 3
Norway 2 1 4 2 1 4
Spain 2 1 5 2 1 5
Sweden 2 1 6 2 1 6
Switzerland 2 1 4 1 1 6
United Kingdom 2 1 3 2 1 3
Other OECD
Australia 2 1 3 2 1 3
Canada 2 1 4 1 1 5
Mexico 2 1 3 2 1 3
New Zealand 2 1 3 2 1 3
South-East Asia
Indonesia 1 1 2 2 1 3
Korea 2 1 4 2 1 5
Malaysia 2 1 2 2 1 3
Philippines 2 1 3 2 1 2
Singapore 1 1 3 2 1 3
Thailand 2 1 3 2 1 3
Oil
Saudi Arabia 2 1 2 2 1 2
VARX order determined by the AIC, with p ≤ 2 and q = 1, where p is the number of endogenous lags and
q the number of exogenous lags
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Wi is the link matrix that allows the country-individual models to be written in terms
of the global variable vector, yt . The Wi s are country-specific (ki +k∗i )×k matrices of
fixed constants defined by the trade-weights that were used above in the construction
of the foreign variables. The global VECM of (7) allows for interaction among the
included economies through three different but interrelated channels: (i) the contem-
poraneous dependence of domestic variables, yi t , on foreign variables, y∗i t , and on
its lagged values, (ii) the dependence of all endogenous variables on common global
exogenous variables (e.g., oil price), and (iii) the nonzero contemporaneous depen-
dence of shocks in country i on shocks in country j . Cross-country shocks are allowed
to be weakly correlated in i j .
Note that in the global VECM representation, domestic variables are no longer
contemporaneously dependent on foreign variables. This implies that we can solve
the global model forward recursively, obtain future values of all endogenous variables
and conduct impulse response analysis. Before doing so in Sect. 4, we first have a
closer look at the statistical properties of the data series.
3.3 Properties of the data series and specification tests
This section summarizes the main characteristics of the data series and the results
from several specification tests. An appendix containing detailed results is available
from the authors upon request.
As a first step in specifying the country-individual model, we determine the inte-
gration properties of the included variables. The error-correction representation of the
GVAR methodology assumes that the included variables are approximately integrated
of order one. We follow PSW and base our unit root tests on weighted symmetric
estimations of ADF type regressions. Real consumption, real output, real effective
exchange rates, and real stock and oil prices are unambiguously I(1) processes for
the vast majority of countries, or else I(0)/I(1) borderline cases. The trade balances
of our focus countries are unambiguously I(1), while most others are I(0). The real
housing price series are I(1) processes with four notable exceptions: US, Belgium, the
Netherlands and Sweden. The last years of the sample period render the processes I(2).
Finally, the hypothesis that interest rates are I(1) is rejected for many countries and
may result in an efficiency loss in estimation. Overall, however, it seems appropriate
for our modeling strategy to treat all variables as approximately I(1). The stability of
the impulse responses below and the eigenvalues of the GVAR model lend credibility
to this conclusion.7
7 The model with consumption appears to be more stable compared to the model with investment included.
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Having established the integration properties, we proceed with specifying the num-
ber of long run cointegrating relationships that exist between both domestic and foreign
variables in each country model. In fact, empirical evidence suggest several long run
relationships. For example, using US data Lettau and Ludvigson (2001) find a coin-
tegrating vector between consumption, wealth and personal income. Case and Shiller
(2003) and Black et al. (2006) document cointegrating relationships between housing
prices, income, and interest rates. There is some evidence that international stock mar-
kets are cointegrated (Kasa 1992), but these results are challenged by Richards (1995).
Meese and Rogoff (1988) investigate the cointegrating properties of real exchange
rates and real interest rate differentials, but reject a stable relationship between both
variables. On the other hand, Bergvall (2004) finds a single cointegrating relation-
ship between the trade balance, exchange rates, relative gdp, and the real oil price for
Scandinavian countries.
We allow the data to determine these cointegrating relationships and, based on the
trace statistic, Table 2 reports the number of cointegrating relationships for each coun-
try model. The number ranges from 1 for India to 6 for Sweden and Switzerland, but for
the great majority of countries, including our G5 countries, we find 3–4 cointegrating
relationships. Note that there can be small differences between the consumption and
investment models, even though the number of cointegrating relationships is identical
for the majority of countries in both models.
Next, virtually all foreign variables y∗i t pass the weak exogeneity test, which is
a key assumption underlying our estimation strategy. However, we do find 8 out of
172 cases to be statistically significant at the 5% nominal level. For our study, it is
reassuring that for the set of focus countries, weak exogeneity can only be rejected for
foreign real output in the Japanese country model, while all other foreign variables
are weakly exogenous.8 Given the size and importance of the US equity market, we
exclude foreign real stock prices from the US country model because weak exogeneity
is violated.
Finally, the structural stability of long-run coefficients, short-run coefficients, and
the error variances is an underlying assumption of the GVAR model. Dees et al. (2007)
point out that structural stability problems are reduced with the inclusion of foreign
variables in the country-individual models. In addition, the GVAR is able to accommo-
date the so-called “co-breaking”, which should make it more robust to the possibility
of structural breaks than reduced-form single-equation models. However, even though
the GVAR can accommodate ‘co-breaking’ the GVAR is probably less suited to deal
with crisis situations and to avoid stability problems we choose to exclude the current
financial and economic crisis from the data.
Following Dees et al. (2007), we consider structural stability tests on the short-
-run coefficients and error variances. These findings suggest that the main reason for
rejection by the tests appears to be breaks in error variances and not changes in the
parameter coefficients. So, most of the structural parameters in our model seem to be
relatively stable and concerns for structural breaks are mitigated. In line with Dees
et al. (2007), we account for heteroskedasticity by using robust bootstrapped standard
8 As a robustness check, we excluded those foreign variables that do not pass the weak exogeneity test.
The differences in estimation are immaterial.
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errors for the confidence bounds of the GIRFs and interpret the GIRFs conservatively
by taking 90% confidence bounds.9
4 Results
The complex cross-border interdependencies that are an integral part of our global
model are best summarized by investigating the dynamic response of the system to
exogenous shocks in the error of a given variable. The analysis is carried out by making
use of generalized impulse response functions (GIRF) which have been introduced by
Koop et al. (1996) for non-linear systems and advanced by Pesaran and Shin (1998) for
vector error-correcting systems. Unlike traditional orthogonalized impulse response
functions, the GIRF neither requires imposing identification restrictions, nor is it vari-
ant to the ordering of the endogenous variables in the global vector, yt . Both are clearly
important considerations in our model that considers a total of 204 endogenous vari-
ables in 29 country models. As there is no strong a priori belief on the exact ordering
of these variables and countries, we do not aim to identify structural shocks.10
In fact, the GIRF does not allow for a structural interpretation of the impulse-
response results, but provides valuable information on the dynamics of the transmis-
sions of shocks. When discussing the results of e.g., the consumption model it is
important to stress that the VAR model allows investment to play a role, even though
investment is not modeled explicitly. For example, investment plays a role through
gdp or the error terms. Hence, when drawing conclusions regarding consumption in
the consumption model, we infer conclusions regarding consumption, but are silent
about investment. This holds vice versa for the investment model.
In what follows, we will investigate the time profiles and dynamic responses of
domestic variables to a one standard error negative shock to (1) the real effective ex-
change rate, (2) domestic real stock prices and, if available, and (3) domestic real hous-
ing prices. In turn, we will focus mainly on whether trade balance movements can be
attributed to consumption and investment changes. The figures show the bootstrapped
median impulse responses for the first 20 quarters following the shock together with
the associated 5 and 95% confidence bounds. To stay focused, we will concentrate on
the G5 countries in the exposition of our results.
4.1 Exchange rate shock
Each of the G5 countries will be exposed to a domestic real exchange rate depreciation.
First, we investigate the effects of this shock on consumption and the trade balance.
Thereafter, we analyze the response of investment and the trade balance to the real
exchange rate shock. Figure 1 presents the results for the first shock. The left column
shows the median and 90% confidence bounds for the one standard deviation negative
real effective exchange rate shock. Naturally, this shock is significantly negative for
9 The confidence bounds are obtained using the sieve bootstrap procedure analogous to Dees et al. (2007)
with 2000 replications.
10 See e.g., Beaudry and Portier (2006) for a structural interpretation of stock price shocks.
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Fig. 1 Domestic response to a domestic negative real effective exchange rate shock, with consumption in
the model. Real effective exchange rate (first column), real consumption (second column), and trade balance
(third column)
all countries, but the magnitude differs, from an initial −1% for France to an initial
−3% for Japan.
The exchange rate depreciation leads to a statistically significant fall in US real
consumption (second column) of about 0.1% on impact and up to 0.4% after 20 quar-
ters. Perhaps surprising, a significant effect is only observed for the US, which is in
terms of trade/gdp ratio, together with Japan, the least open economy of the G5. Ex
ante, we would expect more open economies to be affected more strongly by exchange
rate movements.
Only the US trade balance shows a strong and significant response to a negative
exchange rate shock (third column). Taken together, the finding of a decrease in con-
sumption and improving trade balances contrasts with Goldberg and Tille (2006) and
Gust and Sheets (2006). Both studies argue that exchange rate movements are largely
123
The international wealth channel 999
passed through to the trade balance via exports, leaving US expenditure on imports
relatively unchanged. Here, US demand appears to be an important determinant. We
do not observe the initial J-curve effect, confirming previous studies, among others
Rose and Yellen (1989).
For Germany and Japan, we find that the trade balance first significantly worsens
by about 0.5% on impact, but returns to balance already after the first quarter. This
result seems counterintuitive, because both Germany and Japan are large exporting
nations and the demand for their export products should depend on the exchange rate.
However, it is important to realize that about half of Germany’s trade is with euroz-
one countries and a real exchange rate depreciation is quickly passed on to the other
eurozone countries.11 Therefore, the effect on the trade balance may be quite limited,
which confirms the findings of Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2002). These authors also
find a much weaker dependence of German, French, and UK trade balances on real
exchange rate movements compared to the US.
Figure 2 presents the GIRFs for the model with consumption replaced by invest-
ment. The impulse responses of the real effective exchange rate are very similar to
those in Fig. 2 for all countries. Again, only the US trade balance shows a strong
improvement, but this vanishes after ten quarters. The US investment is only mar-
ginally significantly negative, so it is not obvious that the exchange rate shock is
transmitted via investment to the trade balance.
For Japan and Germany, the trade balance is marginally negative during some part
of the 20 quarter horizon. The magnitude is so small that we should be careful in
drawing strong conclusions from these findings.
4.2 Stock price shock
Next, we expose domestic real stock prices to a one standard error negative shock
in each of the G5 countries. The associated GIRFs for the model with consumption
are shown in Fig. 3. The shock amounts to a drop in real stock prices of 4–6% for
all countries. For the US and Japan, the shock is very persistent and remains signifi-
cantly negative even after 20 quarters. However, UK, French, and German stock prices
become insignificant after a few quarters. This shows that these stock markets depend
to a large extent on global events and local shocks are relatively short lived.
We find a strong response of consumption to the stock price shock for the US and
UK. Real consumption falls by 0.1% on impact and stabilizes around −0.7% after 20
quarters in both countries. For France and Japan, consumption is significantly neg-
ative during the first three quarters for France and from quarter 3 to 10 for Japan.
There is no effect on German consumption. This is suggestive of the finding that the
domestic wealth effect is less pronounced for countries with bank-based, in contrast
to market-based, financial systems (Ludwig and Sløk 2004). These authors also show
that French and German stock ownership is much lower compared to the US and UK,
which is an important explanation for the observed smaller effect.
11 Even before the introduction of the euro in 1999 many European countries pegged their currency (or
allowed exchange rate bands) to the German Mark under the European Exchange Rate Mechanism.
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Fig. 2 Domestic response to a domestic negative real effective exchange rate shock, with investment in
the model. Real effective exchange rate (first column), real investment (second column), and trade balance
(third column)
The international wealth channel is at work in both the US and UK: for both coun-
tries, we document a significant improvement of the trade balance, in combination with
decreasing stock prices and lower consumption. The dynamics differ slightly, i.e., for
the US the trade balance is not significantly positive after the 12th quarter, whereas
in the UK we find that the trade balance only becomes significantly positive after the
sixth quarter and remains so thereafter. For France, we observe a small improvement,
whereas the German and Japanese trade balances are unaffected. This suggests that
the Japanese decrease in consumption is primarily a drop in consumption of domestic
goods and not imported goods.
Figure 4 presents the GIRFs for the second model, where consumption is replaced
by investment. Again, we consider a one standard deviation negative shock to domes-
tic stock prices. Column 1 presents similar results for the stock price shock as shown
123
The international wealth channel 1001
Fig. 3 Domestic response to a domestic negative real stock price shock, with consumption in the model.
Real stock price (first column), real consumption (second column), and trade balance (third column)
in Fig. 3. US and Japanese stock prices remain negative over the predicted horizon,
while the other countries’ stock market returns become quickly insignificant. This is
due to the leading role of the US stock market and relative isolation of Japan.
The GIRFs for real investment show broadly similar patterns as the GIRFs for real
consumption. US investment is significantly negative as of the second quarter, while
UK investments are only marginally significant during quarters 5–11. French, Ger-
man, and Japanese investment remains unaffected. One reason for the wider confidence
bounds of investment compared to consumption is the higher volatility of investment.
In fact, investment is among the most difficult economic variables to model and is
known for its high prediction error in macroeconomic models.12
12 See e.g., Smets and Wouters (2003).
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Fig. 4 Domestic response to a domestic negative real stock price shock, with investment in the model.
Real stock price (first column), real consumption (second column), and trade balance (third column)
Only the UK trade balance improves significantly in response to a stock price shock.
Hence, for the UK we find evidence, albeit weak, in favor of the international wealth
channel through investment. For the other countries this channel does not seem to be
present. On the other hand, the German trade balance become marginally significantly
negative. There is no obvious explanation for this pattern.
4.3 Housing price shock
The final shock is a one standard deviation negative shock to domestic housing prices.
Again, first consider the model with consumption, followed by the model with invest-
ment. Figure 5 shows the impulse response functions for the US, UK, and France.
Housing price index data is not available for Germany and Japan. Column 1 shows the
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Fig. 5 Domestic response to a domestic negative real housing price shock, with consumption in the model.
Real housing price (first column), real consumption (second column), and trade balance (third column)
magnitude of the housing shock, which is close to −1% for all countries and increases
to about −2% for the US and UK and −3% for France. These shocks are smaller than
the stock market shocks, since housing prices are historically more stable than stock
prices.
Column 2 shows that the point estimates of the reactions of consumption are neg-
ative but insignificant for all three countries. We only find a significantly negative
reaction for the UK during the first three quarters. This small effect is surprising since
most previous studies find that consumption reacts stronger to housing price shocks
than stock price shocks (Case et al. 2005). It is even more surprising taking into account
the less stringent collateral and downpayment constraints in the US and UK, facili-
tating consumption out of housing wealth (Muellbauer and Murphy 2008). However,
note that the absolute magnitude of the housing price shock is smaller than the stock
price shock, which explains part of the lower response.
US trade balance improves following the negative shock to the US real housing
prices by up to 1.3% after 10 quarters. However, it is only statistically significant
between quarters 1 and 10. There is no impact on the UK trade balance, while the
French trade balance is marginally significantly positive during the first four quarters
and insignificant thereafter. In sum, for the housing shock we find no evidence in favor
of the international wealth channel.
Figure 6 displays the GIRFs of the model with investment included. The pattern of
the real housing price shocks is similar to Fig. 5 for the US and UK, but differs for
France. For the latter country, the shock becomes insignificant after nine quarters.
Following the housing price shock, only UK real investment responds significantly
negative over the entire horizon. The US and French investment are never signifi-
cantly different from zero. This is surprising, since there exists evidence of a strong
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Fig. 6 Domestic response to a domestic negative real housing price shock, with investment in the model.
Real housing price (first column), real consumption (second column), and trade balance (third column)
relationship between housing prices and housing investment (Iacoviello and Neri
2010). Hence, ex ante we would expect a negative effect for the US. With regard
to the trade balance, again only the UK shows significant results, providing evidence
for the existence of the international wealth channel through investment.
5 Forecast error variance decomposition
Complementary to the GIRF analysis in the previous section, we conduct a generalized
forecast error variance decomposition (GFEVD) to answer the question of how much
of the error variance in forecasting the trade balance can be attributed to shocks in
the real effective exchange rate, real stock market, and real housing prices. Table 3
reports the median variance decomposition percentage, with the 5 and 95% bounds
in brackets. These variance bounds are relatively wide and should be interpreted with
caution. However, the variance decomposition can still provide an indication on the
relative importance of each of the three shocks for the trade balance.
Initially, the percentage for which the trade balance shock explains its own variance
is relatively high for all countries. However, it decreases sharply for the US, UK, and
Japan in both models. It remains high for Germany in both models and for France only
in the consumption model. A high percentage indicates that the trade balance is very
persistent and relatively unaffected by shocks originating in other variables.
Next, we compare the explanatory power of the three shocks in the consumption
model. The medians for all shocks are highest for the US. When comparing the relative
importance of each of the three shocks for the US, while taking into account the con-
fidence bounds, we can conclude that all shocks are about equally important. Hence,
asset price shocks explain a meaningful part of US trade balance developments.
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The international wealth channel 1007
For the UK and France, we find that the median percentages of stock and housing
price shocks are higher than the exchange rate shock. On the other hand, for Germany
the exchange rate shock appears to be more important, while for Japan both shocks
explain only a very small percentage of the trade balance. In sum, asset price shocks
are important for the trade balance in the consumption model, but their importance
differs across countries.
Next, turning to the investment model, the picture is slightly altered. The trade bal-
ance explains a smaller percentage of its own variance, with the decrease being most
pronounced in France and Germany. Interestingly, the three shocks show a different
picture across countries. In the US, the median percentage of the exchange rate is more
than the sum of the stock and housing price shocks. Hence, when replacing consump-
tion with investment in the model, asset price shocks appear to be less important for
the US trade balance. Therefore, the international wealth channel is strongest when
using the consumption channel for the US.
The UK figures are broadly similar to the consumption model, with the role of
housing shocks being slightly more important. For France, asset price shocks are less
important, while in Germany their importance increases. In Japan, the exchange rate
appears to explain more of the variation. So, these results indicate that is important
to distinguish between modeling the international wealth channel via consumption or
investment and that the impact of asset price shocks on the trade balance differs across
countries, thereby supporting the results of the GIRFs presented earlier.
6 Conclusion
In this article, we empirically test for the presence of the international wealth chan-
nel: asset price shocks are transmitted to the trade balance through consumption and
investment. In particular, we test if it is a potential alternative to exchange rate changes
in explaining trade balance movements using the GVAR model developed by Pesaran
et al. (2004) and Dees et al. (2007). It proceeds in two steps. First, we estimate indi-
vidual country VECMs for 29 countries over the period 1981Q1–2006Q4. Second,
we combine these country-individual models into a global VAR representation using
information on bilateral trade patterns. In particular, to study the role of the con-
sumption and investment channel, we estimate one GVAR model with consumption
included, while in the second consumption is replaced by investment.
Using generalized impulse response functions three domestic negative shocks are
analyzed for the US, UK, France, Germany, and Japan: (1) real exchange rate, (2) real
stock price, and (3) real housing price. These results provide evidence in favor of the
existence of the international wealth channel. First, real exchange rate shocks only
seem to impact US developments in consumption and the trade balance. Second, a
negative shock to real stock prices is associated with a significant decrease in consump-
tion and an improvement in the trade balance in the US, UK, and to a weaker extent
in France. When considering the model with investment, we only find weak evidence
for the presence of the international wealth channel for the UK. Finally, a negative
housing price shock only weakly affects consumption in the UK, without an effect on
the trade balance. On the other hand, in the investment model, the negative housing
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price shock is associated with a significant decrease in investment and significantly
improving trade balance in the UK.
In sum, the international wealth channel is an important alternative explanation of
trade balance movements. However, the results cannot be generalized to all countries.
The empirical methodology is suitable to explain trade balance behavior during rela-
tively stable periods. Unfortunately, the model is less suitable to study trade balances
during crisis periods. Further research is needed to study the working of the interna-
tional wealth channel during the current global financial crisis. We believe this to be
a promising future research avenue.
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Appendix
Data sources
– Trade data for all countries are from the IMF Direction of Trade Statistics at the
quarterly frequency and in US$. The trade balance is constructed as the log of
exports over imports and seasonally adjusted in EViews using the X12 method of
the US Census Bureau.
– Nominal consumption, investment, output and inflation data are from the IMF
International Financial Statistics at the quarterly frequency an in domestic cur-
rency. For China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Saudi Arabia, and
Thailand annual data are interpolated to a quarterly frequency in some cases.
We interpolate the data by first taking logs and assuming a constant growth rate
between two annual observations. Real consumption and real output are seasonally
adjusted in EViews using the X12 method of the US Census Bureau.
– Real effective exchange rate data are taken from the IMF International Financial
Statistics at the quarterly frequency.
– Stock price data are from Global Financial Data using a large domestic stock
market index. Stock market index prices are denominated in local currencies and
at the quarterly frequency.
– United States (S&P 500 Composite Price Index), Japan (Nikkei 225 Stock
Average), and India (Bombay SE Sensitive Index)
– European countries: Austria (Wiener Boersekammer Share Index), Belgium
(Brussels All-Share Price Index), Denmark (OMX Copenhagen All-Share
Price Index), Finland (OMX Helsinki All-Share Price Index), France (SBF-250
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Index), Germany (CDAX Composite Index), Italy (Banca Commerciale Itali-
ana Index), Luxembourg (LuXX Index), Netherlands (All-Share Price Index),
Norway (Oslo SE All-Share Index), Spain (Madrid SE General
Index), Sweden (Affarsvarlden General Index), and United Kingdom (FTSE
All-Share Index)
– Other OECD: Australia (ASX All-Ordinaries), Canada (S&P/TSX 300 Com-
posite), Mexico (SE Indice de Precios y Cotizaciones), and New Zealand (SE
Share Capital All Index)
– South-East Asia: Korea (SE Stock Price Index KOSPI), Malaysia (KLSE
Composite), Philippines (Manila SE Composite Index), Singapore (FTSE All-
Share Index), and Thailand (SET General Index)
– Housing price data are from the Bank for International Settlements at quarterly
frequency.
– Both short term and long term interest rates are from the IMF International Finan-
cial Statistics at the quarterly frequency.
– The oil price is the price in US$ of one barrel Brent crude and retrieved through
Datastream.
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